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REEXAMINING THE PHYSICIAN'S DUTY OF
CARE IN RESPONSE TO MEDICARE'S
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM
In October 1976, Lois Wickline was admitted to a Los Angeles-area
hospital for treatment of pain in her back and legs. Her physician deter-
mined that she suffered from an obstruction in her aorta, caused by
arteriosclerosis. Although he operated, removed part of the artery and
inserted a Teflon graft replacement, Wickline developed complications and
required two additional surgeries.' After these surgeries, her physician
decided that she needed an additional eight days beyond the scheduled
discharge date in the hospital. 2
Medi-Cal, a state administered Medicaid program, covered Wickline's
medical expenses. Medi-Cal requires that extensions of hospital stays be
approved by its consultants. Although her physician submitted the appro-
priate form to Medi-Cal, the consultant rejected the extension request and
limited the stay to four additional days instead of eight.3
Despite her physician's initial misgivings, Wickline was discharged
after four days. Her leg subsequently lost circulation and she was readmit-
ted to the hospital. Attempts to save the leg failed, and it eventually was
amputated above the knee. Wickline's treating physician later testified that
had Wickline stayed in the hospital the additional eight days the loss of
circulation would have been discovered and treated. In his opinion, it was a
"reasonable medical certainty" that had his extension request not been
denied by Medi-Cal, Wickline would not have lost her leg.4
Wickline v. State of California is a distressing example of the quality of
care problems that may arise under the new wave of prospective payment
systems. In some prospective payment systems, third-party payors such as
the federal government or an insurance company reimburse hospitals
before treatment is undertaken. In 1981, the most significant of these
prospective payment systems was implemented by the federal govern-
ment's Medicare program. This change from retrospective to prospective
reimbursement affects the amount of revenue a hospital receives. As a
result, hospitals may more often oversee physicians and pressure them to
modify their medical decisions. The introduction of monetary considera-
tions may discourage physicians from making independent and objective
1. Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 663--64, petition for review
granted, 727 P.2d 753, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1986).
2. Id. at 665.
3. Id. at 665-69.
4. Id. at 668-69.
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decisions regarding treatment and may present potentially disastrous con-
sequences for the quality of patient care. This policy, therefore, raises
questions regarding a physician's duty of care to a patient.
In Wickline, the California Court of Appeals indicated that the physi-
cian's standard of care is unchanged by pressures from cost containment
programs. 5 While recognizing the desirability of controlling health care
costs, this Comment argues that physicians who care for Medicare patients
should not be held to a lower standard of care than those who care for
patients not covered by Medicare. Indeed, physicians should be required to
take reasonable steps to ensure that their patients will not be harmed by
financially-motivated treatment decisions.
I. COURTS DEVELOPED THE PHYSICIAN'S DUTY OF CARE
UNDER RETROSPECTIVE NOT PROSPECTIVE
REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEMS
A. The Physician's Duty of Care
In a medical malpractice action based on negligence6 an injured plaintiff
must prove: First, a duty of care owed by the physician to the patient;7
second, a breach of that duty; third, proximate cause; and forth, damages. 8
Courts concluded long ago that public policy9 requires that patients be
5. Id. at 661.
6. Most malpractice actions are based on a negligence theory, however, some are based on
contract. See, e.g., Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1959).
7. Prosser defines duty as an obligation to which the law will give recognition and effect for one to
conform to some standard of conduct. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. As the court in
Wickline demonstrates, so well established is the physician's duty that courts often cite no authority.
Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670; e.g., Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wn. 2d 257, 136 P.2d 341 (1942).
8. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 30, at 164-65.
9. See generally Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 844-45 (5th Cir. 1959) (duty of care imposed
by law); Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. App. 1961) (fiduciary physician-patient rela-
tionship because person in ill health subject to the domination and influence of another plus physician
has unusual opportunity to influence; thus, physicians have duty to act with utmost good faith);
Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard of Care, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 265 (1986);
James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 778, 808 (1953) (ultimate question
whether duty should be imposed as a matter of policy); Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 CoLuNi. L.
REV. 1147, 1163 (1942) (consensual nature of relationship accounts for liability when the standard of
care not met); Smith, Insurance Carrier Liability as a Result of Pre-Admission Screening and Hospital
Stay Guidelines, 12 Oxto N.U.L. REV. 189, 192-93 (1985) (duty arises from inherent nature and call of
medical profession).
In contrast, early courts found that the duty of care sprang from an express or implied contract
between the physician and patient. E.g., Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d at 844-45; Reed v. Laughlin,
332 Mo. 424, 58 S.W.2d 440, 442 (1933); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practioners, 12
VAND. L. REV. 549, 550 (1959).
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protected by a physician's duty of care. 10 The duty attaches once a physi-
cian-patient relationship is established. " The physician fulfills the duty by
conforming to the standard of care recognized by the medical profession'
2
and has no authority to deviate from the standard.
13
In malpractice actions, the customary practice of the profession deter-
mines the standard of care which the physician must follow.14 Courts
granted physicians this ability to set their own standard' 5 because custom-
ary practice was thought to be the only workable test. 16 Neither judge nor
jury was thought to possess the expertise necessary to evaluate the medical
profession, and courts feared the arbitrary imposition of liability based on
uneducated judgment. 17
A physician's duty lasts until the patient no longer needs treatment and
the professional relationship between patient and physician terminates. 18
10. E.g., Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675 (C.P.N.Y. 1891); Nichelson v. Curtis, 117 111. App. 3d
100,452 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1983); Rule v. Cheeseman, 181 Kan. 957,317 P.2d 472 (1957); Kennedy v.
Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754, 757 (1956); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64P.2d 208,212 (1937).
See generally PROSSER § 31, at 170, § 53, at 356, § 32, at 185; McCoid, supra note 9, at 553-58;
Reynolds,LimitsonNegligenceLiability:Palsgrafat5O, 32OKLA. L. REV. 63,66-68 (1979) (physician's
special relationship to patient gives rise to affirmative duty to warn); Smith, supra note 9, at 192.
Hospitals also owe patients a duty of care. See generally R. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 232
(1983); Janulis & Hornstein, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't: Hospitals' Liability for
Physicians' Malpractice, 64 NEB. L. REv. 689, 708 (1985). Once a hospital-patient relationship is
established, the hospital may not, on the basis of an inability to pay, prematurely discharge or deny
treatment to a patient. See, e.g., Le Juene Rd. Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965).
11. See generally McCoid, supra note 9, at 553-56; Annotation, Physician-Patient Relationship,
17 A.L.R. 4TH 132 (1985). Because the relationship is voluntary in the absence of an emergency, a
physician may refuse to accept a patient. E.g., Miller v. Dumon, 24 Wash. 648, 655, 64 P.2d 804, 806
(1901). See generally McCoid, supra note 9, at 553-54. Physicians may limit their practice to a
particular specialty, treatment, or geographical area or to consultation without assuming a duty to
continue care. R. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 227, 229 (1983); A. SoumWICK, THE LAW OF
HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 97 (1978).
12. E.g., Nichelson v. Curtis, 452 N.E.2d at 885; Kennedy v. Parrott, 90 S.E.2d at 754; Ricks v.
Budge, 64 P.2d at 212. See generally McCoid, supra note 9, at 558-75, 605-09.
13. R. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 209 (1983). The patient does not and cannot agree to
excuse a physician who makes mistakes. Morris, supra note 9, at 1164.
14. See generally PRoSSER, supra note 7, § 32, at 189; Furrow, Malpractice Revisited: Of Medical
Errors, Social Transformations, and Tort Standards, 63 NEB. L. REV. 810, 816 (1984); McCoid, supra
note 9, at 605-09; Morris, supra note 9, at 1164.
15. Furrow, supra note 14, at 816.
16. Morris, supra note 9, at 1164.
17. Id.; Furrow, supra note 14, at 816.
18. E.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 98-99 (N.D. Ohio 1965);
Saunders v. Lischkoff, 137 Fla. 826, 188 So. 815,819 (1939); Schmitv. Esser, 183 Minn. 354,236 N.W.
622, 624 (1931); Reed v. Laughlin, 332 Mo. 424, 58 S.W.2d 440,442 (1933); Burnett v. Layman, 133
Tenn. 323, 181 S.W. 157, 158 (1915); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208, 212 (1937); Gray v.
Davidson, 15 Wn. 2d 257,267, 136 P.2d 341,345 (1942); Gross v Partlow, 190 Wash. 489,493,68 P.2d
1034, 1035 (1937).
Continuance of the physician-patient relationship is not wholly at the discretion of the physician.
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The physician must exercise ordinary skill and care in the determination of
when to discontinue treatment. 19 If the physician prematurely discharges a
patient from the hospital or discontinues treatment, the duty of continued
care may be breached. 20 Consequently, the physician may be liable for
abandonment 2' or for a lack of due diligence in attending a patient. 22
Furthermore, the duty of continued care is not dependent on a patient's
ability to pay23 or the patient's failure to pay past bills. 24
B. Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Change in Medicare
Reimbursement
Although Medicare's prospective payment system is used as the primary
example in this Comment, the discussion is equally relevant to state-
administered Medicaid programs such as California's Medi-Cal. 25 Medi-
McCoid, supra note 9, at 556. The relationship may be terminated by mutual consent or by the patient's
dismissal. Also, the physician may withdraw by giving the patient reasonable notice of an intent to
cease treatment, so the patient has adequate time to find another physician. E.g., Payton v. Weaver, 131
Cal. App. 3d 38, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225,229 (1982); Saunders v. Lischkoff, 188 So. at 819; Schmit v. Esser,
236 N.W. at 625; Reed v. Laughlin, 58 S.W.2d at 442; Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675, 676
(C.P.N.Y. 1891); Burnett v. Layman, 181 S.W. at 158; Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d at 208; Gray v.
Davidson, 15 Wn. 2d at 267, 136 P.2d at 345.
19. E.g., Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661,petitionfor review granted,
727 P.2d 753, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1986); Saunders v. Lischkoff, 188 So. at 819; Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d
at 212; Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wn. 2d at 267, 136 P.2d at 345.
20. E.g., Reed v. Laughlin, 58 S.W.2d at 442; Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d at 212 (quite clear that
reasonable care and skill and continued attention required as long as patient needs treatment); Gross v.
Partlow, 190 Wash. at 492, 68 P.2d at 1035.
21. E.g., Saunders v. Lischkoff, 188 So. at 819; Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d at 212; Gray v. Davidson,
15 Wn. 2d at 267, 136 P.2d at 345. Most abandonment cases occurred prior to 1950. This lack of recent
authority indicates how rarely physicians and hospitals abandon patients by prematurely discharging
them.
Abandonment in general means the unilateral severance of a physician-patient relationship when
treatment is necessary and reasonable notice is not given. An inability to pay is not a defense to
abandonment. E.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d at 210-13, 215 (1937); Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. at
677; Lee v. Dewbre, 362 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). See generally Note, The Action of
Abandonment in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REV. 834, 834-36 (1962); Annotation,
Liability of Physician Who Abandons Case, 57 A.L.R. 2D 432 (1961).
22. Annotation, Liability of Physicianfor Lack of Due Diligence in Attending Patient, 57 A.L.R.
2D 379 (1961).
23. E.g., Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. at 677; McCoid, supra note 9, at 555.
24. E.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d at 212, 215.
25. Medicare's prospective payment system was selected because it is the most expansive cost
containment system and has served as a model for state Medicaid programs. See 3 MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 1 13,655, at 5505 (Apr. 1986) (New Jersey); 15,600, at 6559-6 (Apr. 1987)
(Michigan); 15,626, at 6585 (Oct. 1986) (Ohio); 15,632, at 6590 (July 1984) (Pennsylvania); 15,644, at
6601-5 (July 1985) (Texas); 15,646, at 6603-6 (Dec. 1985) (Utah); 15,654, at 6611-8 (May 1986)
(Washington). See generally Rosenblatt, Medicaid Primary Care Case Management, The Doctor-
Patient Relationship, and the Politics of Privatization, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 915 (1986).
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care's system is expected to serve as a model for private insurance com-
panies that develop cost containment programs.
1. Medicare's Original Retrospective Reimbursement System
Contrasted with the New Prospective Payment System
When it enacted the Medicare program in 1965, Congress assured
payment to health care providers for services to the elderly.26 In its initial
form, Medicare reimbursed the hospital on a retrospective "reasonable
cost" per service basis. 27 Critics alleged that the retrospective method built
into the health care system incentives to expand services, to decrease
efficiency, and to raise prices.28
After two decades of rising health care costs29 and fear of continued
increases within the Medicare system, the Health Care Financing Admin-
istration in 1981 sought to control the cost of health care by changing the
reimbursement method. 30 The Health Care Financing Administration acted
on the premise that prospective reimbursement would encourage more
26. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 286, 291
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395xx (1982)).
Medicaid, passed in 1965, provided medical care to the poor. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1965). For a
description of state Medicaid programs, see 3 MEDICARE & MEDICAm GUIDE (CCH) 15,550-15,660
(July 1984).
27. S. RE'. No.23,98th Cong., lstSess. 47, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODECONO. &AD. NEws 143,
187.
28. See generally Sophy, Diagnosis Related Groups and the Price of Cost Containment, 2 J.
CONTEMp. HEALTH L. & Po.'Y 305,306-07 (1986) (no limitation on amount of costs reimbursed); Note,
Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Can Quality Care Survive?, 69 IowA L. REv. 1417, 1418
(1984) (incentives to expand services and raise prices).
29. See generally Wing, American Health Policy in the 1980's, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1501,
1549, 1556 (1986) (analysis of health cost data and trends they reveal).
30. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, tit. VI, 97 Stat. 65, 149 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C. (1982)); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-248, tit. 1, 96 Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C. (1982); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320b-5 (1982) (directions to Secretary of Health and Human Services to develop prospective
payment system). While Medicare funding worked reasonably well, by 1982 the Congressional Budget
Office predicted the exhaustion of the Medicare Trust Fund. This prediction, coupled with the
enormous federal deficit, prompted Congress to request a proposal from the Health Care Financing
Administration to limit the extent to which hospitals would be reimbursed and to develop a system of
prospective reimbursement. After the Department of Health and Human Services submitted the
prospective payment system to Congress, the plan was quickly approved in a modified form. E.g., S.
RE. No. 23, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 143, 187;
Sophy, supra note 28, at 306; Vladeck, Medicare Hospital Payment by Diagnosis-Related Groups,
100(4) ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 576, 576 (1984); Note, supra note 28, at 1418.
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efficient care than retrospective reimbursement. 3 1 The new system thus
reimburses hospitals on a prospective basis. 32
2. Diagnostic Related Groups Generally Determine Hospital
Reimbursement
Under Medicare's prospective payment system, hospitals 33 are paid a
fixed amount for inpatient care on a per case basis, as opposed to a per
service basis. 34 The hospital receives the sum of the fixed amount based on
the patient's diagnostic related group 35 plus any "outlier" payments. 36
Diagnostic related groups37 are an illness classification system. 38 At
31. The Report states:
The bill is intended to improve the medicare program's ability to act as a prudent purchaser of
services, and to provide predictability regarding payment amounts for both Government and
hospitals. More important, it is intended to reform the financial incentives hospitals face,
promoting efficiency in the provision of services by rewarding cost effective practices. In contrast,
the cost-based reimbursement arrangements under which medicare has operated in the past lack
incentives for efficiency. Subject to some limits on overall payment amounts, the "reasonable
cost" reimbursement system simply responds to hospital cost increases by providing increased
reimbursement.
H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 219,
351.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1982). The new system prospectively determines hospital revenue and is
applied on a per discharge basis. 42 C.F.R. §§ 412. 1(a), 412.2(a) (1986).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 412.1 (1986). Medicare's prospective payment
system in general applies to short-term, acute-care hospitals. Other hospitals are excluded and are
reimbursed on a cost basis. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)(B) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 412.22 (1986). Exempt
hospitals will continue to be reimbursed on a per diem cost basis. 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.22(b), 412.23
(1986). The hospital exemptions are: 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.23(a) (1986) (psychiatric); 412.23(b) (re-
habilitation); 412.23(c) (drug and alcohol); 412.23(d) (children's); 412.23(e) (long-term care);
412.23(f) (hospitals outside the United States).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 412.112 (1986). Hospitals are paid a predeter-
mined amount per discharge for inpatient care. A per service basis is, however, still the most common
method of reimbursement. Id. § 412.2(a).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395(b), (d)(1)(A) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(c) (1986). The diagnostic related
group payment covers inpatient operating costs for routine services, ancillary services, special care unit
operating costs such as intensive care, and malpractice insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(a)(4) (1982);
42 C.F.R. § 412.2(c) (1986); Id. § 412.2(a). In general, the hospital cannot bill the patient for
supplemental charges, but must furnish care covered by Medicare for the reimbursed amount. Id.
§ 412.50(c).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i) (1982).
37. The diagnostic related group into which a patient is placed at discharge is based primarily on
the principal diagnosis, but considers the patient's age, sex, procedures performed, discharge status,
and secondary diagnoses. 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.60(c)(1), 412.46(a) (1986). The premise of diagnostic
related groups is that each diagnosis requires substantially the same resource use and costs approx-
imately the same amount.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(d)(4)(A) (1982). Originally developed in the 1970's at Yale University
Center for Health Studies and Yale-New Haven Hospital, when the bill passed through Congress,
diagnostic related groups were the most fully developed classification system. S. REP. No. 23, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 48, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 143, 188; 42 C.F.R. § 412.60
(1986); Vladeck, supra note 30, at 578-79.
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discharge, each Medicare patient is placed into a diagnostic related group39
which was assigned a predetermined reimbursement rate that represents an
average cost for that diagnosis. 40 The assumption is that patients within
each diagnostic related group will require substantially the same health
care resources and have the same average length of hospital stay.41 In
theory, the fixed payment adequately covers the average cost of care for
patients within a particular diagnostic related group, regardless of the
actual cost of treatment of any individual patient.
Outliers are patients whose mean length of hospital stay42 or cost of
care43 is excessive as defined by the Medicare statute.44 Hospitals can
receive additional payments on a per diem basis for patients who can be
classified as outliers. 45 Outlier payments are designed to cover extreme
cases, not to provide additional payment when patients simply exceed the
average length of stay or average cost incorporated into the diagnostic
related group. 46
The prospective payment system does not determine physicians' fees.
Physicians continue to be reimbursed on a retrospective reasonable cost per
service basis.47
39. 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.60(c)(1), 412.46(a) (1986).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(4) (1982). The average cost per diagnosis was based on data gathered
from existing patterns of medicine, not on an estimate of what the practice should be. Vladeck, supra
note 30, at 579. Each diagnostic related group is assigned a weighting factor based on the hospital's
resource use that will be periodically revised to reflect changes in the national cost of health care. 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(4)(C) (1982).
41. A diagnostic related group represents patients that are "clinically coherent and relatively
homogeneous with respect to resource use." S. REP'. No. 23, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 132, reprinted in
1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 143, 188; 42 C.F.R. § 412.10(b) (1986).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 412.82 (1986).
43. 42 C.FR. § 412.84 (1986). Outliers are expected to account for a substantial portion of total
Medicare costs. Entin, DRGs, HMOs and PPOs: Introducing Economic Issues In The Medical
Malpractice Case, 20 FORuM 674, 676 (1984).
44. 42 C.F.R. § 412.80 (1986).
45. Id. § 412.112. Outlier payments are designed to cover cases that do not adequately compensate
a hospital under diagnostic related group methodology. S. REt. No. 23, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 132,
reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 143,191. Although diagnostic related group payments
cover most in-patient costs, substantial costs are excluded and will continue to be reimbursed on a
reasonable cost basis. These are capital related expenditures with an allowance for return on equity, 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(a)(2) (1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.113(a) (1986); 412.113(b) (direct medical education
costs); 412.2(d) (direct medical and surgical services of physicians in teaching hospitals).
Additional revenue may be obtained for indirect costs of graduate medical education and debts for
beneficiaries who did not pay co-insurance or deductible amounts. Id. §§ 412.115(b), 412.118 (educa-
tion); §§ 412.115(a), 412.2(e) (debts).
Finally, the diagnostic related group rate will be adjusted to reflect different wage levels for urban and
rural hospitals. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2) (1982).
46. S. REP. No. 23, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 48, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 143,
191; 42 C.F.R. § 412.80 (1986).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(f0(b) (1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.50(a), 405.550 (1986). The Secretary of
Health and Human Services, however, was directed to collect data and make recommendations on the
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3. The Role of Professional Review Organizations
The Health Care Financing Administration relies on Professional Review
Organizations (PRO) to monitor the cost effectiveness of and the quality of
care delivered under Medicare's prospective payment system.48 In essence,
PROs are utilization review committees composed primarily of physi-
cians. 49 The function of PROs is to review the activities of physicians and
hospitals to determine whether treatment is medically necessary and is
covered by Medicare, whether the quality of care meets professional
standards, and whether hospital services could be more economically
provided on a outpatient basis. 50 PROs also determine payment for some
services. 51
PROs apply professionally developed standards of care when performing
their functions. 52 If, for example, a PRO determines that inappropriate
medical practices were used or that a hospital manipulated diagnostic
related groups so as to obtain maximum reimbursement, then the Health
Care Financing Administration may deny payment, require the hospital to
correct its action, or terminate the hospital-provider agreement with Medi-
care.
53
When a PRO determines that health care will not be paid for by Medi-
care, notice is given54 and physicians, hospitals, and patients are entitled to
a reconsideration of the decision. 55 For example, if the hospital determines
that a patient may be discharged even though the physician believes the
advisability and feasibility of reimbursing physicians by diagnostic related group. H.R. REP. No. 25,
Q8th Cong., 1st Sess. 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 219, 368. In the future,
physicians and hospitals may be reimbursed together rather than paid separately. Vladeck, supra note
30, at 585. See generally Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Implications of
Changes In The Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 708 (1986).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395y(g), 1320c-3 (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 412.44(d) (1986). The committee which
studied the bill believed that the prospective payment system needed a "strong system of medical
review" and that the PRO was the appropriate mechanism. H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 132,
reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 219, 363; Note, supra note 28, at 1425.
PROs review the medical necessity, reasonableness and appropriateness of outlier payments, 42
C.F.R. § 412.22(b) (1986), hospital admissions and discharges, id. § 412.44(a), and discharges to
confirm proper diagnostic related group codification and verification, id. § 412.46(c).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1 (1982). PROs are composed primarily of physicians who represent
practicing physicians in an area. Id. § 1320c-1(1)(A). They are designed to perform review functions as
required by Title 42 and to review quality of care. Id. § 1320c-1(2). Each PRO contracts with the Health
Care Financing Administration. Id. § 1320c-2 (1982). See generally K. Richardson, Flight of the
Phoenix: The Return of Peer Review 13 (April 18, 1986) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with the
Washington Law Review) (history and background of PROs).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3 (1982).
51. Id. § 1320c-3(2).
52. Id. § 1320c-3(6).
53. 42 C.F.R. § 412.48(a) (1986).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(4) (1982).
55. Id. § 1320c-4.
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patient must stay, the hospital may engage a PRO to act as an intermedi-
ary.56 If the hospital and PRO agree that discharge is appropriate, and the
patient is not discharged, the hospital may bill the patient for the additional
days. 57 The patient, physician, or hospital can appeal the determination.
58
The Medicare statute outlines the obligations of physicians and limits
liability in certain instances. Physicians are obligated to provide care
economically as well as care which is medically necessary and meets
professionally recognized standards. 59 Physicians who follow standards
developed by PROs and who exercise due care may be granted civil
immunity from suit.60 This immunity provision has not yet been used as a
defense in a reported medical malpractice case, and its scope is uncertain.
Although the statute grants immunity to physicians who are employed by
the PRO, it does not indicate whether the PRO itself might be liable for its
negligent actions. 61
C. Wickline v. State of California: An Example of Liability for
Negligence Under a Cost Containment Program
In Wickline v. State of California, 62 a court for the first time examined the
effect of a cost containment scheme on a physician's duty of care to a
patient. The cost containment mechanism at issue in Wickline was prospec-
tive utilization review, which requires that authorization for health services
be obtained before the patient receives treatment. 63 The principal issue was
whether pursuant to a cost containment scheme the hospital, physician, or
third-party payor bears the responsibility for allowing a patient to be
prematurely discharged from the hospital. The court found no liability in
that case.64 It indicated in dicta, however, that physicians would be liable
56. 42 C.F.R. § 412.42(c) (1986).
57. Id. § 412.42(c)(2).
58. Id. § 412.42(c)(3).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5 (1982). Physicians that do not fulfill their obligations may be excluded
from the program. Id. § 1320c-5(b).
60. Id. § 1320c-6(c).
61. Id. § 1320c-6(b).
62. Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661,petitionfor review granted, 727
P.2d 753, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1986).
63. The facts of Wickline provide a vivid example of how a patient might be harmed under a cost
containment scheme. Wickline involved Medi-Ca, which is similar to Medicare but does not link
payment to diagnostic related groups. Instead, Medi-Cal relies upon prospective utilization review to
control costs. Id. at 663. Prospective utilization review is another source of pressure upon physicians, in
addition to those present in Medicare and analogous cost containment programs.
64. Id. at 670. The court held that Medi-Cal was not liable to Wickline. As a matter of law, there
was no negligence because Wickline's physician discharged her in compliance with the required
standard of care. Id. at 662.
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for negligent medical decisions made under pressure from a prospective
utilization review committee or other cost containment device.
Wickline is thus the first battle in a larger controversy over the liability of
physicians in a world where their treatment decisions will be more fre-
quently questioned, and where financial pressures to reduce services and to
discharge earlier are standard policy. Before the question of liability can be
settled, the physician's duty of care in this new environment must be
reconsidered and clarified. 65
II. COURTS CAN ASSURE QUALITY OF CARE UNDER
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS BY CLARIFYING AND
EXPANDING THE PHYSICIAN'S DUTY OF CARE
A. Quality of Care May Be Compromised If Hospitals' Financial
Incentives Are Altered
To survive financially under Medicare's prospective payment system,
hospitals have to control costs by keeping them in line with revenue. 66 The
prospective payment system simultaneously rewards efficient management
practices and places hospitals at financial risk. 67 The system rewards
hospitals for cost efficient behavior by allowing them to keep any diag-
nostic related group payment in excess of the actual dollars spent on a
patient.68 Hospitals are at risk, however, because they must absorb the cost
of patient care in excess of the reimbursement amount. 69
1. Physician Practice Patterns May Be Adversely Influenced by the
Financial Pressures Exerted by Hospitals
The assumption of any prospective payment system is that by changing the
financial incentives of hospitals to control health care costs, physician prac-
tice patterns will be altered. 70 A physician's method of practice has always
65. The issue of a duty owed by the hospital and third-party payor under prospective payment
systems is outside the scope of this Comment.
66. Vladeck, supra note 30, at 584.
67. Id.
68. "These changes are intended to create incentives for hospitals to operate in a more efficient
manner because hospitals would be allowed to keep payment amounts in excess of their costs and would
be required to absorb any costs in excess of the diagnostic related group rate." S. REP. No. 23, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 143, 187.
69. 42 C.F.R. § 412.1(a) (1986).
70. E.g., Kachel, The American Physician: From Legacy to Legend?, 81 AM. J. MED. 127, 128
(1986); Vladeck, supra note 30, at 585 (rate of hospital cost increases can be stopped by altering the way
physicians practice); id. at 576 (goal of PPS is to change the way physicians practice in the hospital).
See generally Janulis & Hornstein, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Hospitals' Liability For
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and will always determine the loss or profit of a hospital. 71 Under retrospec-
tive methods of reimbursement, a hospital's reimbursement amount in-
creased when its physicians prescribed more services than other physicians
or treated hospitalized patients for a longer period of time. 72 In contrast,
under Medicare's prospective payment system, additional services increase
the likelihood that the diagnostic related group payment will not fully reim-
burse the hospital for the patient's care. The hospital, in particular, has
financial incentives to pressure physicians to discharge a patient before the
diagnostic related group expires. 73 Thus, there are built-in incentives to
provide less patient care74 and to decrease the length of hospital stay.75
As a result of these incentives, hospitals will directly or indirectly
pressure physicians to modify their medical judgment so the hospital does
71. Sophy, supra note 28, at 313.
72. Entin, supra note 43, at 675 (no incentives to develop efficient means of operation); Sophy,
supra note 28, at 305 (incentives to expand services and advance medical technology); Note, supra note
28, at 1418 (incentives to expand services and raise prices).
73. Entin, supra note 43, at 675-76. Hospitals will be especially concerned with "through put,"
that is, the speed at which a hospital can treat and discharge a patient. Vladeck, supra note 30, at 584.
Each diagnostic related group incorporates an average length of hospital stay. If the physician
discharges the patient earlier than the average number of days incorporated into the diagnostic related
group, the hospital keeps the excess payment. If the physician discharges the patient after the average
number of days incorporated into the diagnostic related group, the hospital absorbs the additional
expense. S. REP. No. 23, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws
143, 187. In contrast, there is no incentive to discharge early under a per diem, cost-based reimburse-
ment. Sophy, supra note 28, at 308.
74. E.g., Iglehart, Health Policy Report Early Experience with Prospective Payment of Hospitals,
314(22) NEw ENG. J. MED. 1460, 1463-64 (1986); Kachel, The American Physician: From Legacy to
Legend?, 81 AM. J. MED. 127, 127 (1986) (prospective payment systems foster minimal use); Vladeck,
supra note 30, at 583, 584 (prospective payment creates incentives forphysicians to undertreat); Note,
supra note 28, at 1421; The Impact ofDRGs on Patient Care, ASIM TODAY 1-7 (Mar. 1984-Oct. 1985)
(survey by the American Society of Internal Medicine). Contra Iglehart, supra note 74, at 1463 (Health
Care Financing Administration believes there is no solid body of evidence of systematic reduction in
quality of care). Furthermore, less care does not necessarily mean inadequate care, but can be an
improvement in efficiency and quality.
Hospital admission decisions will also be affected. Hospitals may increase admissions of marginally
ill patients, restrict admissions to particular profitable diagnostic related groups or to particular
profitable patients within a group, or deny unprofitable patients access to care. Entin, supra note 43, at
676; Sophy, supra note 28, at 315; Note, supra note 28, at 1424.
75. E.g., Entin, supra note 43, 676-77; Iglehart, supra note 74, at 1464; Kachel, The American
Physician: From Legacy to Legend?, 81 AM. J. MED. 127, 128 (1986); Sophy, supra note 28, at 315;
Vladeck, supra note 30, at 583 (diagnostic related groups may encourage premature discharge of
patients because hospital revenue is fixed regardless of length of patient's hospital stay); Note, supra
note 28, at 1421; General Accounting Office Study, Senate Select Committee on Aging Staff Report,
reported in a hearing on November 12, 1985 in 478 MEDIcARE & MEICAmI GUIDE (CCH) 5-6 (1985)
(beneficiaries being discharged from hospital when still in need of care); The Impact ofDRGs on Patient
Care, ASIM TODAY 1-7 (Mar. 1984-Oct. 1985) (survey by the American Society of Internal Medicine)
(internists report hospitals pressuring them to discharge prematurely).
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not lose money. 76 In response, physicians may be compelled to factor the
hospital's reimbursement amount into their medical decisions. Physicians
may also be persuaded to relinquish their decision making authority. They
may believe that their autonomy has been impinged upon by the hospital, its
utilization review committee, or PROs. 77
2. Professional Review Organizations Are Inadequate To Assure
Quality of Care Under Medicare's Prospective Payment System
While the Health Care Financing Administration acknowledges that
"perverse economic incentives" may impact the quality of care that a
patient receives, 78 it relies on PROs to prevent deterioration in treatment
quality.79 Although PROs have increased their vigilance over quality of
care, 80 many critics believe they are, standing alone, inadequate to assure
quality of care. 81 First, the dual purposes of PROs, to control costs and to
assure quality, conflict with one another and may prevent them from
aggressively patrolling physicians and hospitals. 82 Second, PROs lack the
76. Iglehart, supra note 74, at 1464 (hospitals pressuring physicians to violate their medical
judgment); Sophy, supra note 28, at 314-15 (hospitals will scrutinize physicians and pressure them to
vary or modify their practices); Vladeck, supra note 30, at 585 (greater external scrutiny of physicians'
practice by the hospital administrator, the in-house utilization review committee, and PROs).
Although the delivery of medical care within the hospital has grown increasingly complex and
physicians have less control over the delivery of care, hospitals do not control the medical decisions of
physicians. Janulis & Hornstein, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Hospitals' Liability For
Physicians' Malpractice, 64 NEB. L. REv. 689, 702 (1985). In Wickline, the medical experts for both
sides agreed that the treating physician decided the treatment necessary for the patient. Wickline v.
State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, petition for review granted, 727 P.2d 753, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 560 (1986).
77. In general, physicians fear the erosion of their decision-making power. One physician believes
that the change in Medicare's reimbursement takes away the physician's decision-making responsibility
and gives it to the hospital administrator. He also believes that the prospective payment system
"'mandates" the length of hospital stay for the patient. Kachel, The American Physician: From Legacy
to Legend?, 81 AM. J. MED. 127, 128 (1986).
78. See 49 FED. REG. 234, 304 (1984); H. R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 132, reprinted in
1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 219,364 ("there may be an incentive for hospitals to increase their
admissions or reduce the quality or availability of care").
79. The Health Care Financing Administration also believes that the ethical, legal, and financial
incentives to deliver health care will help assure the delivery of quality care. See 49 FED. REG. 234,
304-05 (1984).
80. Health Care and Its Costs 35 (C. Schramm ed. Nov. 13-16, 1986) (paper presented at the
Seventy-Second American Assembly).
81. Iglehart, supra note 74, at 1464; Sophy, supra note 289, at 319 (responsibility of administrator
and physician to maintain quality); Note, supra note 28, at 1444-47; K. Richardson, Flight of the
Phoenix: The Return of Peer Review 10-14 (April 18, 1986) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with
the Washington Law Review).
82. The Impact of DRGs on Patient Care, ASIM TODAY 5 (Mar. 1984-Oct. 1985) (survey by the
American Society of Internal Medicine). Furthermore, outside the Medicare system, there are not
PROs to monitor quality of care abuses.
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monetary and human resources necessary to monitor all patients. 83 Third,
PROs are not yet and arguably never will be firmly established and operat-
ing in all areas. 84 Fourth, peer review historically has not been an effective
means of quality control.85 Therefore, PROs alone cannot maintain quality
care within the Medicare system. 86
B. By Validating and Expanding the Existing Duty of Care Courts
Assure Quality of Care for the Medicare Patient
The role of the judicial system will be pivotal in assuring quality of care
for patients. 87 Courts may validate existing duties and standards and pro-
mote new duties or standards in response to the decline in health care
quality.88 The threat of medical malpractice deters undesirable physician
conduct 89 and thus is essentially a means of controlling quality.90 Because
change can be triggered by a single plaintiff, society need not wait for the
legislature to address the quality of care problem. 91
83. Vladeck, supra note 30, at 584. Individual patients might be overlooked as physicians adopt
"cookbook medicine." Iglehart, supra note 74, at 1464.
84. The PRO simply cannot monitor all health services within its geographical area. Note, supra
note 28, at 1446 (1984).
85. Furrow, supra note 14, at 813. See generally Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Qualityl
Cost Trade-Offs In Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 6 (1975) (history of
Professional Standards Review Organizations).
86. Sophy, supra note 28, at 318 (unknown whether PRO can maintain quality). One critic believes
that malpractice actions cannot assure the quality of care because first, persons who are refused
admission have no cause of action; second, victims may have no incentive to file an action; and third,
injured plaintiffs must find an attorney willing to accept the case. A patient grievance mechanism is
recommended to assure quality care under Medicare. Note, supra note 28, at 1433-34.
87. Health maintenance organizations are an example of a cost containment system in which courts
hold physicians to the same standard of care required for physicians in fee-for-service medicine. A
health maintenance organization, like Medicare's Prospective Payment System, controls the cost of
health care by changing the practice patterns of physicians. In particular, health maintenance organiza-
tions create financial incentives that encourage early discharge of patients. Quality of care questions
have also arisen with health maintenance organizations. In part, the legal system helped assure quality
of care by requiring that health maintenance organization physicians conform to the standard of care of
other physicians. Courts can do the same with physicians reimbursed through Medicare's new
prospective payment system.
88. Furrow, supra note 14, at 834.
89. Furrow, supra note 14, at 813; 3 F. HAIuFR, F. JAMEs & 0. GRAY, THE LAW oFToRs § 18.1, at
650 (1986) (system of liability may be designed to punish or deter wrongdoers or to compensate victims
or distribute their loss).
90. Furrow, supra note 14, at 812, 833 (regulates medical errors). In fact, the Health Care
Financing Administration assumes that the threat of malpractice will act to assure quality by deterring
the negligent practice of medicine. See generally P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACICE: THEORY,
EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 9-17 (1985); Bovbjerg, MedicalMalpractice on Trial: Quality of Carels
The Important Standard, 49 LAw & ComN'Tw. PROBS. 321 (1986) (relief for the private sector).
91. Furrow, supra note 14, at 815, 834.
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The physician's duty of care in this new prospective payment environment
must be clarified to maintain quality care. Many physicians are confused
about their decision-making authority and responsibility when their medical
decisions run contrary to a third party's assessment.92 Unless a physician
clearly understands how the system works and the duty to Medicare patients,
quality of care problems will arise from the change from retrospective to
prospective reimbursement. A physician must understand first, that the
patient's financial status does not factor into the treatment decision and
second, that the physician, not the hospital or Medicare, continues to make
and will continue to be liable for treatment and discharge decisions, even
when reimbursement will not fully cover the cost.
1. Physicians in Medicare's Prospective Payment System Must Make
Medical Decisions in Conformity with the Recognized Standard of
Care
The Medicare statute defines the obligation of physicians by requiring
them to provide care economically and to meet professionally recognized
standards. 93 In enacting the prospective payment system, Congress did not
intend to diminish the common law duty nor lower the standard of care. 94
2. The Recognized Standard of Care Requires Physicians To Make
Medical Decisions Without Regard to the Patient's Ability To Pay
Medicare's prospective payment system and other forms of prospective
reimbursement raise the question of whether the hospital's reimbursement
92. E.g., Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661,petitionfor review granted,
727 P.2d 753, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1986) (demonstrates that Wickline's physician who believed that
Medi-Cal mandated discharge did not fully understand the Medi-Cal program); Entin, supra note 43, at
674; Kachel, The American Physician:FromLegacy toLegend?, 81 AM. J. MFD. 127,127 (1986) (some
physicians believe that medicine is in the midst of a revolution and that diagnostic related groups
mandate the number of days in the hospital); Vladeck, supra note 30, at 590 (physicians may feel their
professional autonomy is threatened). See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
Medicare's prospective payment system is designed to compensate adequately hospitals and physi-
cians. If hospital administrators and physicians realize that the overall level of hospital performance
determines long-term profitability, not the individual patient's expenses, they will not pressure
physicians. Vladeck, supra note 30, at 585. Under Medicare's prospective payment system hospital
reimbursement is only limited in certain instances. First, hospitals are not limited to the diagnostic
related group payment, but can obtain additional revenue. Second, the reimbursement amount is based
on the average cost of care per diagnosis. In the long run hospitals will theoretically break even. Finally,
physicians themselves are assured of payment even if the patient's diagnostic related group expires.
Problems of perception, however, still remain. Hospitals and physicians believe they will not be
adequately compensated under prospective payment systems. Consequently, courts must deal with the
potential problems of prospective payment.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (1982).
94. Id. § 1395ww. The statute specifically incorporates PROs to assure that quality is maintained.
Id. § 1320c-3.
Reexamining the Physician's Duty
amount should be considered in treatment decisions, particularly decisions
regarding discharge. 95 In the past, a patient's ability to pay never deter-
mined the physician's obligation to the patient.96 The court in Wickline v.
State of California indicated that cost limitation programs should not be
permitted to corrupt medical judgment. 97 In contrast, some commentators
now argue that cost containment schemes inject financial factors into the
treatment decision. 98
The prospective payment system is not an invitation to ration care
according to the reimbursement received by the hospital, but is an admoni-
tion to save money when to do so is reasonable. 99 The language of
Medicare's prospective payment system does not suggest that physicians
consider the hospital's reimbursement amount in their treatment decisions.
Although care is to be economically delivered, only unnecessary care is to
be eliminated.100 The prospective payment system does not mandate that
patients be discharged when the reimbursement amount will not fully cover
the cost of care or when the average length of stay for the patient's
diagnostic related group expires. 101 Instead, decisions are to conform to the
recognized standard of care and the physician's duty of continued care lasts
until the patient no longer needs treatment, not merely until the patient runs
out of funds. 102
If financial pressures cause a physician to deviate from the the required
standard of care, then the patient's health is threatened. 103 To assure that
quality of care does not drop below the recognized standard, the duty of
care owed by the physician to the patient cannot depend on whether
payment to the hospital or physician is limited.104 By holding a physician
95. Hospitals will pressure physicians to violate their medical judgment. Iglehart, supra note 74, at
1464.
96. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
97. Wiekline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, petition for review granted, 727
P.2d 753, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1986).
98. Entin, supra note 43, at 674, 676 (non-medical considerations are now legitimate); Iglehart,
supra note 74, at 1463 (question is whether new payment approach is appropriately influencing the
judgment of physicians).
99. See generally Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy
Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345 (1981); Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden
Legal Issues, 59 TEX. L. RV. 1401(1981); Schuck, MalpracticeLiability and the Rationing of Care, 59
TEx. L. REv. 1421 (1981); Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2 J.
CoN'EMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23 (1986).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5 (1982).
101. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
103. The physician's relationship to a patient in this situation is analogous to the position of an
attorney who represents a client while an insurance company pays the attorney. Although an attorney is
paid by the insurance company, the attorney represents the client.
104. The law has been and should remain that once the physician-patient relationship is estab-
lished, the physician owes the patient an obligation of continued care and can terminate the relationship
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liable when the patient's reimbursement method or amount is incorporated
into the treatment decision, courts affirm the duty of care and help assure
that care meets professionally recognized standards.
Further, if a physician's obligation depended on Medicare's reimburse-
ment to the hospital, then the elderly would in many cases receive substan-
dard care. 105 A two-tiered system of health care would develop, one level
for the young and one for the elderly. In enacting Medicare, Congress made
a public policy determination to provide care for the nation's elderly. 106
Care was and is expected to meet professionally recognized standards.
Congress did not intend that the elderly be discriminated against by the
health care profession.
3. The Recognized Standard of Care Requires Physicians, Not Third
Parties, To Take Responsibility for Medical Decisions
Another fundamental issue raised by Medicare and other prospective
payment systems is the proper allocation of medical decision-making
responsibility. 107 The Medicare statute is clear: physicians who treat Medi-
care patients are no different than physicians who do not. Both must meet
the standards of the profession. 108 According to customary practice, physi-
cians cannot delegate their decision-making responsibilities to the hospital
or to a third-party. 109 The physician alone is ultimately responsible for
treatment and discharge decisions. 110
in only limited instances. The physician cannot deliver substandard treatment based on the patient's
inadequate financial resources. Courts recognized this principle by maintaining that the lack of an
ability to pay is not a defense to abandonment or lack of due diligence. If the relationship is terminated
early or substandard care delivered, the physician may be subject to liability. See supra notes 18-24 and
accompanying text.
105. A New York court explained:
Whether the patient be a pauper or a millionaire, whether he be treated gratuitously or for reward.
the physician owes him precisely the same measure of duty, and the same degree of skill and care.
He may decline to respond to the call of a patient unable to compensate him, but if he undertake the
treatment of such a patient, he cannot defeat a suit for malpractice. . . upon the principle that the
skill and care required of a physician are proportioned to his expectation of pecuniary recompense.
Such a rule would be of the most mischievous consequence; would make the health and life of the
indigent the sport of reckless experiment and cruel indifference. Even though, therefore, the
defendant was not to be paid for his attendance, he was still bound in law to treat the plaintiff with
the requisite skill and the requisite care.
Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675, 677 (C.P.N.Y. 1891).
106. Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice La, lit Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 1004, 1019 (1985).
107. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The "'Accepted
Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1249 (1975).
108. Nothing in the statute authorizes federal control over the practice of medicine. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395 (1982).
109. This situation is analogous to the physician-nurse relationship. Just as physicians cannot
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Regardless of the pressures created by prospective payment systems, the
physician must continue to make medical decisions so that the quality of
patient care is maintained. The physician is in the best position to make the
medical decisions for the patient. The physician is educated to care for the
patient. The physician knows the patient, has treated the patient, and can
assess the patient's needs. Patients entrust themselves to their physicians
precisely because they, more than anyone, can assure that patients receive
high quality medical care. .By holding physicians liable when they abdicate
their decision-making responsibility, courts affirm the duty of care and help
assure that patient care meets the recognized standard even when physi-
cians are pressured by third-parties to relinquish their duty.
Furthermore, by insisting that the physician retain control over the
patient's medical decisions, courts check the adverse financial incentives of
the hospital, PROs, or other reviewing entity. 1 1 Physicians do not have
direct economic incentives to discharge patients, because their fees con-
tinue to be paid on a retrospective reasonable cost per service basis. 112
C. Quality of Care Can Be Maintained Under Medicare's Prospective
Payment System by Expanding the Physician's Duty
In Wickline v. State of California, 113 the court indicated that a physician
who complies without protest to a third-party payor decision when his
medical judgment dictates otherwise remains ultimately responsible for the
patient. 114 To use the most likely scenario, the physician cannot discharge
the patient contrary to the required standard of care,115 but must make some
delegate their responsibilities to nurses, they also cannot rely on a third party payor to replace their
medical judgment. Morris, supra note 9, at 1166.
Some argue that decision making has been taken from physicians by Medicare's prospective payment
system, and that the physician's ability to deal with disease and the patient is threatened. Kachel, The
American Physician: From Legacy to Legend?, 81 AM. J. MED. 127, 128 (1986).
110. Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, petitionfor review granted, 727
P.2d 753, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1986).
111. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
113. Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
114. Id. at 671. In addition to the court's dicta in Wickline, a similar duty was imposed in an early
20th century abandonment case. A physician was held liable for a breach of his duty to "assert his
influence and authority to induce and to require his patient to remain in the hospital and thereby avoid
the risk to her life incident to any removal." Morrell v. Lalonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435, 436 (1923).
This duty to be reasonable requires physicians to take minimal steps to protect their patients when they
believe the patient's health is at stake.
115. See supra notes 6-24 and accompanying text.
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effort to keep the patient in the hospital. 116 By thus expanding the physi-
cian's duty of care, the legal system acknowledges the quality of care
problem in prospective payment systems and provides a solution which
protects the physician from liability and the patient from harm. 117
1. The Expanded Duty of Care Owed by a Physician to a Patient
The expanded duty of care would require a physician to do what is
reasonable under the circumstances. 118 The duty would arise only when the
physician disagrees with a determination of a hospital, PRO, or other third-
party payor, 119 and believes that the standard of care requires that the
patient receive a particular treatment or an extended hospital stay. Reason-
ableness in this situation does not mean that physicians must aggressively
116. The physician could have appealed the adverse Medi-Cal determination. Wickline v. State,
228 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
This duty arises most often under prospective payment systems like Medi-Cal which use prospective
utilization review. Under prospective utilization review, care is more often directly denied. Further, the
Medicare statute purports to grant civil immunity to physicians who comply with the standards of a
PRO and those who are employed by a PRO. While the scope of the immunity provision is unclear, it
may serve to preempt expanding state law duties for physicians that treat Medicare patients. Because no
statutory immunity is involved, the proposed expansion to the physician's duty would apply to
prospective payment systems such as Medicaid and to insurance carriers that develop similar programs.
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6 (1982). The implication of the immunity provision is that patients may be harmed
when physicians exercise due care and follow the standards of the PRO.
117. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
In addition to expanding the physician's duty, expanding hospital liability has also been suggested as
a medical malpractice reform. Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law In Light of Medicare Cost-
Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1004, 1017-22 (1984).
In the context of the Medicare prospective payment system, the duty to be reasonable arises when a
physician believes hospital care is required, but a PRO determines the patient could be discharged. The
duty could arise when a PRO determines care could be more economically provided on an outpatient
basis, but the treating physician believes that care must take place in the hospital. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320c-3(a)(1)(C) (1982).
118. The duty to be reasonable does not give rise to an entirely new tort. It is not a new duty, but
merely a logical expansion of the duty of continued care. In this context, a physician who acts
unreasonably would be liable for abandonment or for a lack of due diligence when attending a patient.
On a more general level, courts have imposed affirmative duties when a person had the power to take
reasonable steps to remove the peril of another and when there was a special relationship between the
two parties. The physician is in a position to take reasonable steps to remove the threat to the patient's
health. Further, because of the nature of the physician-patient relationship it has and can support
affirmative duties. For example, the physician-patient relationship gives rise to the physician's affir-
mative duty to warn a patient of a particular condition or medication that might make the patient's
participation in certain activities dangerous. See generally Reynolds, Limits on Negligence Liability:
Palsgraf at 50, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 63, 67 (1979) (special relationship between physician and patient
gives rise to an affirmative duty to warn a patient). In general, when the peril to a plaintiff comes from a
source unconnected with the defendant, the defendant is not liable for an omission to act. James, Scope
of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 N. W. U. L. REv. 778, 802 (1953).
119. The physician might believe that the patient needed medical treatment or additional hospital
days.
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pursue all avenues to obtain the treatment or guarantee that the patient
receives care. Reasonableness means that physicians must be the patient's
advocate if they believe the patient requires care. Depending on the factual
setting, reasonableness could require that physicians confirm that the
patient or the hospital requested a review of a decision to deny treatment or
additional days in the hospital, request a review directly to a PRO or other
appellate body,120 obtain or provide, if possible, the necessary treatment, or
discharge when medically appropriate with the proper preparation, such as
access to out-patient services, referrals, and instructions for care. 121
2. An Expanded Duty of Care Will Help Maintain Quality Care
The health of patients is jeopardized if patients are left to appeal a
treatment decision on their own. An expansion of the physician's duty is
necessary because patients often will not be adequately represented by
themselves or their families. Patients may not understand the importance of
the notice given by the PRO or third-party payor, and may not be in a
position to request a review. 122 Other health professionals may not know
precisely what the patient medically needs or when a review is essential for
the patient's health. Patients and their families may not know how to argue
effectively that the decision be overturned. Finally, patients may simply be
too sick or without family or friends, and thus incapable of seeking review.
The hospital alone should not be responsible for pursuing a review of the
treatment decision1 23 because it has a direct financial interest in the pa-
tient's treatment and discharge. 124 As a result of its conflict of interest, the
hospital may not always vigorously appeal the decision.
The physician's duty should be expanded so that the patient is repre-
sented when treatment is denied. Neither the patient nor the hospital can
adequately or aggressively assist the patient in seeking review. Further, the
potential consequences to the patient's health are great. Physicians should
represent their patients because of the nature of the physician-patient
relationship. 125 Physicians can represent their patients because they know
120. An appeal process is not a formal hearing. An appeal is essentially a reconsideration of the
decision and can usually take place over the phone. Physicians thereby may supply additional facts or
rationales for their decisions.
121. Wickline is an example of a case where the physician discharged with appropriate preparation
and met the standard of care. Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661,petition for
review granted, 727 P.2d 753, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1986).
122. Concern has been expressed that the patient and family may receive inadequate or false
information. Iglehart, supra note 74, at 1464.
123. Under prospective payment, the hospital can often represent the patient in a request for review.
124. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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what the patient medically needs. They can explain in medical terms their
reasons for keeping the patient in the hospital or for providing a particular
treatment. Finally, physicians that treat patients under a prospective pay-
ment system will be pressured to deviate from the standard of care, but they
do not have a direct financial conflict between revenue and care. 126
Physicians may object to an expansion of their duty of care. Physicians
may argue first, that they are not trained to be advocates; second, that they
do not have the time or the knowledge to pursue an appeal process; and
third, that their medical malpractice insurance premiums will rise and their
exposure to malpractice actions will increase. 127
A possible solution to these objections is for the hospital and physicians
to develop an internal appeal mechanism.128 Whenever a physician dis-
agreed with a determination by a PRO or third-party payor, the physician
would contact a liaison within the hospital. That person, armed with
information supplied by the physician, would actually request and pursue a
review of the decision. The extent of the physician's duty under those
circumstances would be to alert the designated person.
3. By Holding Third-Party Payors Liable for Their Negligence, Courts
Would Deter Them from Interfering with Physicians
The extension of liability to third-party payors has been embraced as a
possible solution for the medical malpractice woes of physicians. 129 Ex-
tending liability to a third-party payor is only appropriate when physicians
have fulfilled their obligation to the patient. Liability might appropriately
be extended where, despite the best efforts of the physician, the negligence
of the third-party payor resulted in injury to the patient. 130 The court in
Wickline v. State of California indicated that third-party payors, such as
Medi-Cal, could be held liable when physicians' medically inappropriate
decisions resulted from defects in the cost containment scheme. 13'
126. Some cost containment schemes do provide direct financial benefits to physicians. These
schemes are outside the scope of this Comment.
127. The expanded duty may be a trade off between physician autonomy and increased exposure to
liability.
128. A similar mechanism is in place in many hospitals. The duty of care owed by the hospital to
the patient might also expand under prospective payment systems.
129. E.g., Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, petition for review
granted, 727 P.2d 753, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1986); Smith, Insurance Carrier Liability As A Result of
Pre-Admission Screening And Hospital Stay Guidelines, 12 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 189, 190 (1985); Note,
Rethinking Medical Malpractice in Light of M.edicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1004 (1986).
130. If the patient requires care, the physician and hospital must provide the care or be held liable.
This might be a case of comparative negligence rather than absolute negligence. Extending liability to a
third party when a physician dropped below the required standard of care because of pressures from the
hospital or third-party payor, is not recommended. The physician has the primary duty to the patient.
131. Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
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Liability might also be extended to a PRO in some situations. 132 For
example, when a physician has complied with the standards developed by a
PRO and the patient was harmed because the standards were defective, the
PRO could be held liable. While the Medicare statute may provide immu-
nity to physicians who follow the PRO standard, and to the physicians
employed by the PRO, it does not indicate whether the PRO itself could be
held liable for the negligence of its employees. If a PRO cannot be sued, an
injured patient could be left without a remedy. By providing for a medical
malpractice action against PROs, courts would provide an effective remedy
and deter PROs from acting negligently.
Courts, however, must be careful when they extend liability to third
parties. A consequence of extended liability is that the hospital and third-
party payor become irrevocably involved in patients' treatment decisions.
With potential liability hanging over their heads, hospitals and third-party
payors will surely demand a role in the decision making process. Given the
direct correlation between revenue and length of hospital stays, the amount
of third-party payor reimbursement could then, unfortunately, become a
common factor in the patient treatment decision. Patient care could thus
suffer if no single entity had final responsibility for decisions. Therefore,
courts that contemplate extending liability to third parties should not
confuse the responsibility of the physician, but extend liability only when
the patient is harmed and the physician fulfilled the duty of care to the
patient.
II. CONCLUSION
The change from retrospective to prospective reimbursement, as ex-
emplified by Medicare's new prospective payment system, introduces
financial incentives that may compromise the quality of patient care. While
the legal community has only begun to examine the effects of cost con-
tainment programs on liability, the medical community has demonstrated
that it is confused and frustrated about who will be responsible for a
patient's medical treatment. The courts can help alleviate this confusion,
and combat inherent quality of care problems, by affirming that the
physician who treats Medicare patients will be liable for failing to meet the
recognized standard of care. Furthermore, by requiring physicians to take
reasonable affirmative action when they disagree with a third-party payor's
132. For example, assume that a PRO determines a patient may be discharged contrary to the
physician's judgment. Although Medicare allows the hospital to bill the patient, the patient may not
have the ability to pay for the care. This patient would have a right to appeal the decision so care could be
obtained. If the physician fulfilled the expanded duty of care, yet the reconsideration is unreasonably
delayed and the patient is harmed, then a PRO might be liable.
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decision regarding treatment, courts can combat quality of care dangers
and allow physicians to retain primary control over patient care.
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